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Lily R. Robinton*
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ABSTRACT
Today's digital devices allow users to store an astounding
amount ofpersonal information and data of all types. People now
favor hard drives and e-mails over file cabinets and letters. When
conducting criminal investigations in today's high-tech world,
forensic analysts may compare digital fingerprints rather than
physical ones. Investigators must obtain search warrants before
examining any digital device for evidence of criminal activity, just
as they would before searching a suspect's car, home, or office. In
the digital context, however, the warrant requirement goes awry.
Traditional search and seizure rules fail to prevent general,
exploratory searches, which threaten individual privacy rights.
Courts recognizing this problem have adopted "special
approaches" for conducting digital media searches. Although
these approaches provide greater protection for privacy rights,
they often severely hamper legitimate law-enforcement interests.
In order to both preserve privacy rights and promote justice,
legislatures must enact laws directed at the search and seizure of
digital media. These laws should (1) require investigators to
follow narrow search protocols, but allow expanded searches
where necessary; (2) require investigators to obtain a second
warrant before seizing out-of-scope evidence, with a narrow
exception; and 3) require a taint team to review digital media
containing privileged or third party files.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 26, 2009, searches and seizures of digital
property within the Ninth Circuit ground to a screeching halt.' The
culprit? A landmark opinion authored on that date by the Chief
Judge of the Ninth Circuit, Alex Kozinski, in a case already
fraught with controversy: United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc.2 (CDT). CDT stemmed from the federal government's
investigation into the illegal distribution and use of steroids in
Major League Baseball (MLB), which implicated well-known
players such as Barry Bonds, Alex Rodriguez, Sammy Sosa, and
Manny Ramirez.3 Several years of investigation gave the
government probable cause to believe that at least ten Major
League Baseball players had received illegal steroids from Bay
Area Labs Cooperative. Federal investigators obtained a warrant to
search the computer records of a private company retained by the
MLB Players' Association to oversee its drug testing program.
4
The warrant authorized seizure of drug test records pertaining to
those ten named players, but prosecutors discovered and reviewed
a directory containing hundreds of records relating to other sports'
drug testing programs. Prosecutors then sought additional warrants
to seize records and specimens pertaining to approximately one
hundred other players who had tested positive for steroids. This
move led to a heated debate in several lower courts over whether
the government acted properly in reviewing and seeking additional
warrants for data that fell outside the scope of the initial search.5
In CDT, a limited en banc panel comprised of eleven
judges overturned an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion written by a
three-judge panel in favor of the government. The CDT majority
1 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court at 1, 6, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDTII), 579
F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354) ("The
government is accordingly laboring under the direct effects of this new legal
regime. Many United States Attorney's Offices have been chilled from seeking
any new warrants to search computers.").
2 CDTII, 579 F.3d.
3 See id at 993; Derek Regensburger, Bytes, BALCO, and Barry Bonds: An
Exploration of the Law Concerning the Search and Seizure of Computer Files
and an Analysis of the Ninth Circuit's Decision in United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1151, 1151
(2007); Paul Elias, Feds Seek Rehearing of Baseball Drug List Ruling,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 25, 2009.
4 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing (CDT 1), 513 F.3d 1085,
1090-94 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'den banc and vacated, 579 F.3d 989.
'See CDT II, 579 F.3d at 993-94.
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held that the government had willfully disregarded the limitations
of the search warrant to obtain out-of-scope evidence illegally;
however, it was not the majority's disapproval of the government's
actions that catalyzed the ensuing squall. In his August 26, 2009,
opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski wrote, "This case is about a federal
investigation into steroid use by professional baseball players.
More generally, however, it's about the procedures and safeguards
that federal courts must observe in issuing and administering
search warrants and subpoenas for electronically stored
information." 7 After determining that the government had acted
improperly, the opinion set forth extremely restrictive guidelines to
govern the search and seizure of digital property. 8 The majority
took a significant step in shifting its focus from the facts of the
case to the general issue of how magistrates and federal agents
should issue and execute search warrants for electronically stored
information. Styled as "guidelines," but viewed by magistrate
judges as mandatory, the new rules set forth in CDT have wreaked
havoc on government investigations in the Ninth Circuit, and have
been criticized for departing from controlling precedent.9 The
opinion has caused such a stir that Solicitor General Elena Kagan,
along with every U.S. Attorney's Office in the Ninth Circuit, and
7 579 F.3d at 993.
8 Chief Judge Kozinski summarized his rules as follows:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government
waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence
cases.
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by
specialized personnel or an independent third party. If the
segregation is to be done by government computer personnel,
it must agree in the warrant application that the computer
personnel will not disclose to the investigators any
information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual
risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to
seize that information in other judicial fora.
4. The government's search protocol must be
designed to uncover only the information for which it has
probable cause, and only that information may be examined
by the case agents.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient
may lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping
the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and
what it has kept.
Id. at 1006 (internal citations omitted); see Hugh Kaplan & Christine
Mumford, Attorneys, Academics Sort Through Landmark Case on
Computer Searches, 85 CRiM. L. REP. 688 (2009).
9 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court, supra note 1, at 1, 5, 8-14.
2009-2010
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five top attorneys from Main Justice, have petitioned the full
twenty-seven member court to reconsider the decision.'
0
This is not the first controversy to arise over the search and
seizure of digital property. Crooks and innocents alike store
information relating to every facet of their lives on digital devices,
making them attractive targets for criminal investigators." Courts
across the nation have struggled to apply Fourth Amendment
principles to digital searches to ensure the searches do not expand
into exploratory hunts that threaten individual privacy. Their
attempts have produced a tangle of conflicting authority, and as
demonstrated by CDT, a digital search resolution remains elusive.
To add to the confusion, different government agencies may
disagree about how to approach and execute a search and seizure
of digital property.
12
Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit accepts or declines
the federal government's petition to reconsider its decision in CDT,
or whether the Court overturns the decision, the storm of
controversy created by CDT has underscored the need for a
uniform set of rules that successfully balances individual privacy
concerns against legitimate law enforcement interests. As Chief
Judge Kozinski stated, "Everyone's interests are best served if
there are clear rules to follow that strike a fair balance between the
legitimate needs of law enforcement and the right of individuals
and enterprises to the privacy that is at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment."' 13 His rules, however, along with the rules of other
courts, have thus far fallen woefully short of achieving this
balance. This Article addresses these conflicting interests and
argues for a legislative solution that combines and harmonizes
existing rules.
Part I of this Article begins by introducing the history and
framework of the warrant requirement, which grew from the
Fourth Amendment. Part I also addresses the significance of the
threat to privacy posed by unlimited digital searches in response to
those who claim that law-abiding citizens need not worry about
privacy intrusions. Part II addresses the complications introduced
by digital media, and Part III explains the conflicting ways in
which courts have responded to these complications. Part IV
argues that legislatures should create statutory schemes to address
10 See Elias, supra note 3; Laura Ernde, Prosecutors: Steroid Ruling Hurting
Other Investigations: Obama Asks 9th Circuit To Reconsider Steroid Ruling,
DAILY J., Nov. 27, 2009. Due to the large size of the Ninth Circuit, a limited en
banc panel consisting of eleven judges usually convenes to hear appeals. See
Elias, supra note 3.
11 See infra Part II.
12 See Kaplan & Mumford, supra note 8.
1 CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).
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the issue. Part IV goes on to propose rules governing search and
seizure of digital property, which would tackle the unique privacy
concerns raised by these searches without hampering government
investigations.
I. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT, AND THE "I HAVE
NOTHING To HIDE" RETORT
A. The History and Framework of the Warrant
Requirement
In 1761, the citizens of Massachusetts lived without the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. 14 They lived in a world
where "writs of assistance," a type of general warrant, authorized
meticulous searches of their private homes and businesses, and
allowed searching officials to pry open locks, cast aside bars, and
seize offending articles on no more than bare suspicion. 15 In
February of 1761, a lawyer named James Otis gave a passionate,
five-hour speech against the perils of the "writ of assistance."
16
What Otis lacked in brevity, he made up for in emotion as he
effectively conveyed the fear incited by the specter of the general
warrant:
Every one with this writ may be a tyrant; if this
commission be legal, a tyrant in a legal manner,
also, may control, imprison, or murder any one
within the realm. In the next place, it is perpetual;
there is no return. A man is accountable to no
person for his doings. Every man may reign secure
in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and
desolation around him, until the trump of the
14 See JOHN CLARK RIDPATH, JAMES OTIS, THE PRE-REVOLUTIONIST: A BRIEF
INTERPRETATION OF THE LIFE AND WORK OF A PATRIOT 37-45 (1898); see also
Writs of Assistance: Colonial America, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/
hl205.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
15 See RIDPATH, supra note 14; Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General
Warrants, and the Case for the Courts, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 120, 123 (2008);
James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance (Feb. 1761), available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm; James Otis, In Opposition to Writs of
Assistance (Feb. 1761) [hereinafter Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance],
reprinted in 8 THE WORLD'S FAMOuS ORATIONS 27 (William Jennings Bryan
ed., 1906).
16 See RIDPATH, supra note 14, at 48; Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance,
supra note 15; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and
the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 53 (1996). James Otis
represented a group of Boston Merchants opposing the writs before the Superior
Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 76.
2009-2010
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Archangel shall excite different emotions in his
soul. 17
Otis' plea to banish the writ of assistance fell on deaf
ears, 18 but a few years later, in the cases of Wilkes v. Wood 19 and
Entick v. Carrington,20 the English court refused to allow the
government to rely on general warrants lacking probable cause to
justify the arrests of political activists and subsequent searches of
their homes and belongings. These two cases have been called "the
O.J. Simpson and Rodney King cases of their day," 21 and likely
influenced the Framers of the Constitution as they drafted an
amendment that would protect the American citizens against the
terrors preached by James Otis.
22
The Fourth Amendment, straight from the quills of the
Framers, ensures that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.23
A government-instigated search of anything a person deems
private must be reasonable to pass muster under the Fourth
Amendment. 24 The Supreme Court has developed two procedural
tools to ensure the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The first
17 See RIDPATH, supra note 14, at 53; Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance,
supra note 15.
18 Writs of Assistance, supra note 14.
19 Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.); Lofft 1.
20 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.); 2 Wils. K. B. 275.
21 Amar, supra note 16, at 65.
22 See id. at 64-65; Trepel, supra note 15, at 123-24.
23 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24 See id; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155 (1925) (setting forth a
reasonableness standard for probable cause); Investigations and Police
Practices, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. ClUM. PROC. 3, 43-44 (2009) ("Under the
Fourth Amendment, every search or seizure by a government agent must be
reasonable."); Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1156. The Fourth Amendment
protects individuals from government intrusions that invade privacy.
Investigations and Police Practices, supra, at 5-8. A person must have a
legitimate expectation of privacy to merit protection under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. If a person has a subjective expectation of privacy, and society
accepts that expectation as objectively reasonable, the Supreme Court will deem
that expectation legitimate. Id.
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is the warrant requirement. With some exceptions, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
25
Before investigators can obtain a search warrant, they must
have probable cause to believe they will discover evidence of the
alleged crime during the search. A neutral magistrate must
consider the facts and circumstances presented in a warrant
application, and may issue the warrant only after finding a
substantial basis that probable cause exists to search the named
area and seize any evidence. 26 The warrant must describe with
particularity the places investigators plan to search and items they
hope to seize. The particularity requirement defines the scope of
the warrant, and protects the privacy interests in a person's home
and possessions from broad, exploratory rummaging by ensuring
that each search is narrowly tailored to the justifications presented
to the magistrate.
27
A warrant contains sufficient particularity when it leaves
nothing to the discretion of the executing officers and officers "can
with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended. 28
However, an overbroad warrant, or a warrant containing mistaken
information may be "cured" if executing officers can rely on
personal knowledge to narrow and identify the place intended to be
searched.29 An affidavit incorporated by reference or attachment to
25 The warrant requirement applies to any place in which a person holds a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures
of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 80 (1994).
26 See id; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place."); Investigations and Police Practices, supra
note 24, at 21-28 (2009).
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that warrants shall "particularly
describe[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized");
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) ("[T]he problem [posed by the
general warrant] is 'not that of intrusion Per se, but of a general, exploratory
rummaging in a person's belongings.' ... [The Fourth Amendment addresses
the problem] by requiring a 'particular description' of the things to be seized."
(alterations in original) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467
(1971)); Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 27-28; Winick,
supra note 25, at 86.
28 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925); see also Andresen, 427
U.S. 463; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 28-31.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Judd, 889 F.2d 1410, 1413 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that a warrant that failed to describe a company's second office still sufficiently
particular because agents checked city business license records, bank records,
corporate filings, and the address on the company's letterhead to determine the
location to be searched; the offices were only 25-30 feet apart; and the company
had only leased the second office three weeks prior to the search). But see
United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701, 704 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (holding that officers'
2009-2010
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the warrant that lists items not mentioned in the warrant itself may
also cure an overbroad warrant.
3 0
When a defendant challenges the particularity of a warrant
authorizing the search of his or her records, courts will deem the
warrant particular if it has been narrowed as much as the
information available to the agents will allow. For example, in
United States v. Gardiner,3 1 the Sixth Circuit found a warrant
listing a variety of personal and business records to be sufficiently
particular because it sought items pertaining to the time frame of
the crime, and all of the listed records would logically relate to the
alleged financial crimes.32 In United States v. Mathison,33 the
Eighth Circuit deemed particular a warrant seeking all records
pertaining to the suspect's seventeen distinct businesses, as well as
information with respect to eleven individuals. The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the affidavit supporting the warrant contained
considerable evidence of the suspect's involvement in illegal
activities and demonstrated that the records sought would
substantiate the suspect's involvement. 34 In finding the warrant
sufficiently particular, the court in Mathison declined to employ
the exclusionary rule, which is the second procedural tool designed
to ensure the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 35 The
exclusionary rule functions to suppress from the record any
evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure. This can
include evidence obtained during execution of an overbroad
warrant and evidence that falls outside the scope of the warrant.
36
The exclusionary rule does not proceed directly from the
Fourth Amendment as a means of "cur[ing] the invasion of the
defendant's rights which he has already suffered,, 37 but rather
developed as a judicially created remedy designed to deter
personal knowledge of the suspect's name and a neighbor's word that the
suspect lived in the "fifth mobile home" could not cure a warrant that failed to
name the suspect, did not describe the premises to be searched, and erroneously
pinpointed the premises as the "third mobile home" when none of the searching
officers had previously observed the mobile home and thus had no other
knowledge by which to narrow the search).
30 See, e.g., In re Search of Office of Tylman, 245 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.
2001); United States v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537, 548 (9th Cir. 1993).
31 463 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2006).
321d at 471.
33 157 F.3d 541 (8th Cir. 1998).
34 Id at 547-49.
31 Id at 549.
36 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 40-
41; Winick, supra note 25, at 80, 85.
37 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
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constitutional violations.38 Thus, where the exclusion of evidence
would not advance the purpose of the rule, the court will allow its
introduction under the so-called good faith exception.39 For
example, in United States v. Leon,40 the district court found that the
magistrate who had granted the warrant had done so in error, as the
evidence submitted with the warrant application failed to establish
probable cause.41 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declined to
suppress evidence on the grounds that the exclusionary rule
"cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter
objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." 42 The good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule thus highlights the importance
of issuing warrants based on a proper articulation of places to be
searched and items to be seized.
B. The "I Have Nothing To Hide" Retort
A person will likely feel that the government has violated
his right to privacy if agents begin rummaging through the
medicine cabinet to search for stolen fifty-inch flat screens, which
clearly cannot fit next to the Aspirin. The same person, however,
may fail to perceive an examination of every file on his computer
as intrusive. The obscure nature of the digital search, and the lack
of any spatial correlation between the evidence sought and the files
examined, can mask potential privacy violations. It is easy to
discount the danger of the general digital search and argue
complacently, "So what if the government looks through every file
on my computer? I have nothing to hide. I'd rather sacrifice a little
privacy for the sake of bringing criminals to justice." On this view,
justice should trump privacy: government intrusion into digital
data would be a threat to criminals, but not to law abiding citizens.
Most people do not sympathize with the white-collar criminal who
gets caught with child pornography during a search of his
computer for evidence of investment fraud. Most proponents of the
"nothing to hide" viewpoint would argue that only criminals need
fear a general search of digital media.
43
38 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24,
at 201.
39 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919-20; Investigations and Police Practices, supra note
24, at 204-06.
40 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
41 Id. at 900-03.
42Id. at 919.
43 See Daniel J. Solove, "I've Got Nothing To Hide" and Other
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 745, 746-47 (2007) ("The
argument that no privacy problem exists if a person has nothing to hide is
frequently made in connection with many privacy issues .... The nothing to
2009-2010
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Scholar Daniel Solove addresses this common retort by
pointing out that "[p]rivacy . . . is not the trumpeting of the
individual against society's interests, but the protection of the
individual based on society's own norms and values .... [P]rivacy
has a social value. '4 4 Solove argues persuasively that a society
without the cushion of privacy would be unlivable; life in a free
society necessitates rules that may unintentionally shield criminal
behavior.4
5
Furthermore, even those who think they have nothing to
hide might find themselves unpleasantly surprised by what might
turn up in a probing search of their digital media. Solove captures
this possibility with a colorful quotation from Friedrich
Durrenmatt's novella Traps, in which a man who believes himself
innocent inquires as to his crime: "'An altogether minor matter,'
the prosecutor replie[s] . . . 'A crime can always be found.' ' 46 In a
world where computers facilitate and store oceans of data about
every aspect of our lives, it seems certain that some type of crime
can always be found among the bits and bytes of the average hard
drive.
II. LET'S GET DIGITAL! DIGITAL!
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved to suit
searches conducted in a physical world with the human senses.
47
"In the time before the atom, what we could see with our eyes was
all there was. Similarly, when the country was young and the
universe of searchable data was limited to 'papers, and effects,'
law enforcement agents were able to literally see everything
covered by Fourth Amendment protections." 48 This is no longer
true. Technology now allows us to conduct much of our social and
professional lives in cyberspace, while storing hoards of
information of all types in digital format. People today use
computers to store images, movies, documents, personal records,
and correspondence. 49 Computers double as "photo albums,




46 Id. at 750 (quoting FRIEDRICH DURRENMATT, TRAPS 23 (Richard & Clara
Winston trans., 1960)).
47 See Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure,
105 COLuM. L. REv. 279, 290 (2005); infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text
(discussing the plain view doctrine and its sensory corollaries).
48 Aaron Stanley, Note, The Continuing Evolution of Consent and Authority in
Digital Search and Seizure, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179,
188 (2008).
49 See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply To
Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 35 (2007),
11
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stereos, telephones, desktops, file cabinets, waste paper baskets,
and televisions," 50 "postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating
services, movie theaters, daily planners, shopping malls, personal
secretaries, virtual diaries, and more." 51 The storage capacity of
computers today is astonishing. As of April of 2009, the highest
capacity commercial hard drives were capable of storing two
terabytes of data. A terabyte can hold approximately 1000 hours of
video, 250,000 four-minute songs, 1,000,000 thick books of about
500 pages each, or as much information as can be printed on the
paper from 50,000 trees. A desktop hard drive might store between
120 gigabytes and two terabytes.5 2 Even a measly 80-gigabyte
desktop drive stores the equivalent of 40 million pages of text.
53
When investigators decide to search a suspect's computer,
they face vast quantities of information. If stored in written form,
that data might fill an entire library. As technology advances to
allow a user to squeeze larger quantities of data into tinier spaces,
the amount of information that can be contained in digital format
will continue to grow.54 Furthermore, in addition to the wealth of
information stored on files purposely saved by an individual,
investigators mine the hard drive for deleted files and glean
information from metadata. 5
5
http://ssrn.com/abstract-id=949575. See generally Encyclopedia Britannica
Online, Living in Cyberspace, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
130429/computer/216089/Living-in-cyberspace (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
50 Trepel, supra note 15, at 128.
51 United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Orin S.
Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARv. L. REv. 531, 569
(2005)).
52 See Darren Murph, Western Digital's 2TB Caviar Green HDD on sale in
Australia, ENGADGET (Jan. 26, 2009, 11:47 PM) http://www.engadget.com/
2009/01/26/western-digitals-2tb-caviar-green-hdd-on-sale-in-australia (Jan. 26,
2009, 11:47 p.m.); Hard Drive Help, The Spacious Terabyte Hard Drive,
http://www.hard-drive-help.com/terabyte-hard-drive.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2010); Wisegeek, How Much Text Is in a Kilobyte or Megabyte?,
http://www.wisegeek.com/how-much-text-is-in-a-kilobyte-or-megabyte.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
53 Trepel, supra note 15, at 128-29.
54 "North Carolina State University engineers have created a new material that
would allow a fingernail-size computer chip to store the equivalent of 20 high-
definition DVDs or 250 million pages of text, far exceeding the storage
capacities of today's computer memory systems." Researchers Develop
Material That Could Boost Data Storage, Save Energy, PHYSORG.COM, Oct.
20, 2009, http://www.physorg.com/newsl75252581.html.
55 Metadata consists of information that characterizes the digitally stored data
and answers the "who, what, when, where, why, and how about every facet of
the data that are being documented" on a digital storage device. USGS,
Frequently-Asked Questions on FGDC Metadata, http://geology.usgs.gov/tools/
metadata/tools/doc/faq.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009); see also Trepel, supra
note 15, at 129.
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A. Digital Context Complications
The advanced storage capabilities of today's digital media
complicate the scope of digital searches. For one, the particularity
requirement can malfunction in the digital context because
searching for evidence of a crime on a computer is akin to
searching for a needle in a haystack. Investigators usually cannot
predict where, or in what format, they might find the relevant
information, and thus cannot "particularly describ[e]" the "place to
be searched" or the "things to be seized. 56 As Professor Orin Kerr
points out, "[i]n the physical world, different spatial regions are
used for different purposes. This allows the police to make
educated guesses as to where evidence may or may not be found
.... , In the physical world, one might look for an incriminating
letter in a file folder or a desk drawer. Drugs or guns might be
stored in shoeboxes or bedside tables. The money might be under
the mattress. In the computer context, however, the location of
evidence does not necessarily depend on the character of the
evidence itself. Information stored on a computer is represented by
"zeros and ones of electricity," 58 making the format and location of
any stored information flexible, and difficult to predict.
Investigators searching a suspect's house for stolen stereo
equipment can logically rule out the medicine cabinet as a possible
location, but anticipating the location of electronic evidence is
inherently more difficult because "electronic evidence can be
located anywhere. . . . [T]he investigator can never rule out a
particular part of the hard drive ex ante."
59
Some courts resolve the issue by allowing warrants to
describe the media to be searched in general terms, without
requiring investigators to pinpoint the particular files they plan to
search.6( This rule recognizes the concern that investigators might
not be able to predict whether evidence will be located on a
suspect's computer, an external hard drive, a CD, a flash drive, or
some other external storage device.6 1 Other courts have taken a
56 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Kerr, supra note 47, at 303.
57 Kerr, supra note 47, at 303.
581d. at 284.
59Id at 304.
60 See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]his type of
generic classification is acceptable 'when a more precise description is not
possible."' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d
75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982)).
61 Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1157; Stanley, supra note 48, at 217; see, e.g.,
United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The government
knew Lacy had downloaded computerized visual depictions of child
pornography, but did not know whether the images were stored on the hard drive
or on one or more of his many computer disks ... there was no way to specify
13
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more restrictive approach by requiring investigators to name at
least the type of evidence sought.62 Most courts, however, allow
broad particularity designations when investigators cannot predict
precisely which files contain evidence. These courts recognize that
investigators may need to seize information that appears
innocuous, but that may later prove incriminating in conjunction
with other evidence.
63
B. Current Law Enforcement Methods for Conducting
Digital Searches
So how might investigators wade through this quagmire of
data? The simplest option would be for the officer to sit down at
the suspect's computer and examine the data manually. The officer
would simply turn the computer on, and begin opening files one-
at-a-time in search of something incriminating.
Practical drawbacks, however, preclude the use of this
method.64 For one, the investigator would have to sift through a
forest's worth of documents, making the search extremely
inefficient. Such a search would fail to locate incriminating files
deleted by the suspect, and the officer would risk destroying
evidence during the search process. Simply opening a file or
turning on a computer can overwrite deleted data, and may alter
time stamps on the data, which investigators might need to show
what hardware and software had to be seized to retrieve the images
accurately.").
62 See, e.g., United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005).
63 See United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982)
("[C]rimes may require the assembly of a 'paper puzzle' from a large number of
seemingly innocuous pieces of individual evidence: 'The complexity of an
illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection when the State has
demonstrated probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and
probable cause to believe that evidence of this crime is in the suspect's
possession.' It is universally recognized that the particularity requirement must
be applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending on the type of
property to be seized, and that a description of property will be acceptable if it is
as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation
permit." (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 481 n.10 (1976)));
Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1156-57; see also United States v. Jacob, 657
F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the complexity of the alleged crime as a
factor in determining whether the warrant met with particularity requirements);
United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 548 (1st Cir. 1980) (Campbell, J.,
concurring) ("The investigators usually do not, and often cannot, know in
advance precisely what they will find when they search through files pursuant to
a warrant. They, therefore, may find it difficult to describe what they are
seeking, other than to say that they expect to find, and will seize, documents
constituting evidence of the particular fraud.").
64 See G. Robert McLain, Jr., Note, United States v. Hill: A New Rule, But No
Clarity for the Rules Governing Computer Searches and Seizures, 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1071, 1092-93 (2007).
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the time the suspect created or last accessed a file. Not only would
this method erase possibly relevant information, it would also
defeat investigators' attempts to authenticate the evidence and
disprove tampering. An investigator might as well "walk[] into a
murder scene with muddy boots, remov[e], bare-handed, a knife
from the victim, drop[] it in his coat pocket and return[] to the
office."
65
It is nearly impossible to search a hard drive without the
assistance of some kind of software program.66 To search digital
media properly, investigators elicit the help of digital forensics
specialists, who use a number of tools and forensics techniques.
67
Courts have consistently recognized that requiring police to search
digital media at the suspect's home or office could create an
extreme burden on both the individual's privacy, as well as on
police resources. Investigators might need to camp out for days to
conduct a thorough search, which would severely disrupt the
suspect's life or business. Forensic analysts would need to cart
their own computers, equipped with forensic tools and special
programs, to the scene of every search. This would create an
enormous hassle and burden investigative resources. To alleviate
these concerns, courts generally permit removal of digital media to
an off-site location for examination by experts, although some
courts urge investigators to return equipment as soon as possible to
minimize disruption of an individual's activities.
6 8
65 Id at 1094.
66 United States v. Long, 425 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e observe that
it is impossible to search computer hardware or software without using some
type of software."); Interview with Chris Beeson, Director of the Regional
District Forensics Lab for the Northern District of California (Dec. 2, 2009). The
Regional District Forensics Lab for the Northern District of California is one of
fourteen regional computer forensics laboratories across the country. Regional
computer forensic labs conduct digital forensic examinations for all law
enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, within
each region. Interview with Chris Beeson, supra.
67 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66; see also McLain, supra note 64,
at 1093; Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1155. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, available at http://www.cybercrime.
gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf [hereinafter DOJ GUIDELINES] (setting forth
guidelines for searches and seizures of digital media).
68 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer
Searches and Seizure: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 267
(2006); Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV.
531, 541 (2005); McLain, supra note 64, at 1093-94; see also, e.g., United
States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hay, 231
F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535-36
(1st Cir. 1999) (upholding seizure and subsequent off-site search of computer
for "needles in the computer haystack"); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("To be certain that the medium in question does
15
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To avoid contaminating or damaging any digital evidence,
forensic investigators first make a "bitstream" copy of the media
they plan to search. The bitstream image captures every piece of
information on the target drive, including files accessible by the
normal user, deleted files, metadata, and empty space.
Investigators save the bitstream copy in "read only" format to
ensure they do not accidentally alter the evidence during analysis.
69
Forensic investigators then narrow the set of data to be searched
using "known fingerprints" or "hash value" programs, and forensic
tools such as EnCase or Forensic Tool Kit (FTK).7 °
Before analyzing investigators' search methods under the
Fourth Amendment, one must have a basic understanding of how
hash value programs operate. A "hash value" is an identifier that
characterizes a data set. The relationship between a hash value and
its data set compares roughly to the relationship between an
organism and its DNA sequence; analysis of two separate data sets
will rarely return the same hash value. Just as forensic analysts use
DNA to determine the identities of criminal suspects or victims,
digital forensic investigators use hash values to identify data-
programs, images, files, etc.--on a computer.
7 1
A hash value program converts each data set on the target
drive into its corresponding identifier and matches the resulting
identifiers with known identifiers. For example, investigators
might suspect an individual of using a specific hacking program, or
of downloading a particular image of child pornography. By
comparing hash values from the suspect's computer with known
values for the hacking program or the image, investigators can
not contain any seizable material, the officers would have to examine every one
of what may be thousands of files on a disk-a process that could take many
hours and perhaps days. Taking that much time to conduct the search would not
only impose a significant and unjustified burden on police resources, it would
also make the search more intrusive." (internal citation omitted)); cf United
States v. Leveto, 343 F. Supp. 2d 434, 441 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (approving of
investigators' steps to minimize upheaval of defendant's business, including
downloading and copying files at the scene rather than removing them for off-
site review); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) ("At
the very least, the government should copy and return the equipment as soon as
possible.").
69 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 265-67; Interview with Chris Beeson, supra
note 66.
70 McLain, supra note 64, at 1094; Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66;
Interview with Hanley Chew, Assistant U.S. Att'y, U.S. Attorney's Office, San
Jose Branch (Nov. 16, 2009).
71 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66; Interview with Hanley Chew,
supra note 70; see also Kerr, supra note 68, at 541 ("A hash is a complicated
mathematical operation, performed by a computer on a string of data, that can be
used to determine whether two files are identical.").
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determine if either exists on the suspect's hard drive. 72 Hash
programs can also recognize "normal" files, such as Microsoft
Windows or Word Perfect, which commonly turn up on
computers. Forensic investigators negatively screen out these
common operating system files and applications to reduce the size
of the data set they will search.73
Forensic tools such as EnCase and FTK allow investigators
to access deleted files, eliminate common operating system files,
preview image files, flag encrypted files, and search the entire hard
drive or active files by keyword or phrase. These tools also allow
investigators to identify mismatched file extensions. For instance,
if a suspect attempts to hide incriminating evidence and mislead
investigators by changing the .jpg extensions on images of child
pornography to .doc extensions, the forensic program will alert the
investigator to the altered files.74 However, criminals may devise
other strategies for disguising incriminating evidence, which
forensic tools will not detect. For example, the suspect might
embed the image of child pornography within a word document, as
opposed to changing the file extension. A forensic investigator
searching for images in .jpg files may overlook the embedded
evidence in the .doc file. The forensic program will not flag such
files as altered or suspicious.
75
III. DEVELOPING DIGITAL RULES
As digital media searches have become more frequent,
courts face the challenge of applying Fourth Amendment
principles, which were designed for discrete physical-world
searches, to vast and amorphous digital spaces. Courts and scholars
remain divided on the issue, and have roughly separated into two
camps. 76 Adherents of one viewpoint advocate for application of
existing rules to digital searches, and argue that computers are
nothing more than glorified containers holding files that represent
physical documents.77 Followers of the other viewpoint argue that
the "container analogy" is inadequate, and search of digital media
72 Kerr, supra note 68, at 541; Interview with Hanley Chew, supra note 70.
Forensic analysts also use hashes to ensure the bitstream copy accurately
matches the original drive. Kerr, supra note 68, at 546.
73 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66.
74 McLain, supra note 64, at 1094-95.
75 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66.
76 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 196.
77 See, e.g., id. at 271 (arguing that "there is nothing 'special' in the nature of
computer searches that differentiate [sic] them in any principled way from other
document and container searches.").
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requires a "special approach" with new rules and procedures. 78 The
prevailing concern in both camps remains the same: whether
existing principles suffice in the digital arena to prevent every
digital search from becoming the kind of general, exploratory
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
A. Traditional Rules Allow Investigators To Scan All
Digital Media Files-No Search Protocol Required
Courts willing to compare computers to file cabinets
recognize that the versatility and massive storage capacity of
computers complicate the task of parsing through intermingled
files. Investigators examining computers face a plethora of
intermingled data and cannot avoid combing through oceans of
material not specified in the warrant. 79 Courts have resolved this
issue with respect to physical documents by allowing investigators
to scan all documents in order to ascertain their relevancy. 80 InAndresen v. Maryland, the court noted:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent
in executing a warrant authorizing a search and
seizure of a person's papers that are not necessarily
present in executing a warrant to search for physical
objects whose relevance is more easily
ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is certain
that some innocuous documents will be examined,
at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they
78 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 & n.7 (10th Cir. 1999)
(discrediting the comparison of computer searches to searches of file cabinets,
and advocating for a "special approach" with respect to search and seizure of
digital evidence); Winick, supra note 25, at 110 ("An analogy between a
computer and a container oversimplifies a complex area of Fourth Amendment
doctrine and ignores the realities of massive modem computer storage.").
79 See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998)
("Computer searches present the same problem as document searches-the
intermingling of relevant and irrelevant material-but to a heightened degree.").
80 See, e.g, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); United States v.
Schandl, 947 F.2d 462, 465 (11th Cir. 1991) ("It was inevitable that some
irrelevant materials would be seized as agents searched through numerous
documents for evidence of tax evasion and failure to file, crimes that are
generally only detected through the careful analysis and synthesis of a large
number of documents."); United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604 (1 1th Cir.
1983) ("[A]n officer acting pursuant to such a warrant is entitled to examine any
document he discovers, but that 'the perusal must cease at the point of which the
warrant's inapplicability to each document is clear."' (quoting United States v.
Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); United States v. Abbell, 963 F.
Supp. 1178, 1198 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("When executing a search warrant for
documents, searching agents are entitled to at least cursorily examine each
document at the specified search location.").
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are, in fact, among the papers authorized to be
seized.8'
By allowing investigators to peruse all documents in a
suspect's possession, as opposed to only those stored in folders
with relevant labels, courts "recognize[] the reality that few people
keep documents of their criminal transactions in a folder marked
'drug records."
82
Accordingly, most courts that accept the comparison
between computers and file cabinets allow investigators to open
and scan all digital files to ascertain the responsiveness of the
data.83 In United States v. Gray,84 the court noted that "[c]omputer
records are extremely susceptible to tampering, hiding, or
destruction" and concluded that the searching agent "was not
required to accept as accurate any file name or suffix and limit his
search accordingly." 85 The courts in United States v. Hunter and
United States v. Hill also declined to limit investigators' search
methods on the grounds that criminals can easily mask
incriminating evidence so it will not be discovered using rigid,
86 8predictable protocols. In United States v. Fumo,87 the court stated
that
regardless of the search protocols or keywords used
by the government, the government may open and
briefly examine each computer file to determine
whether it is in the description recited in the
warrant. . . . 'no tenet of the Fourth Amendment
prohibits a search merely because it cannot be
performed with surgical precision.'
88
Some scholars argue that limiting the ability of
investigators to scour digital media might encourage criminals to
hide evidence outside the range of the search. They contend that
81 Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.ll.
82 United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990).
83 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 198. For example, United States v. Gray
compared digital evidence to paper records and documents, which "unlike
illegal drugs or other contraband, may not appear incriminating on their face. As
a result, in any search for records or documents, 'innocuous records must be
examined to determine whether they fall into the category of those papers
covered by the search warrant."' 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(quoting United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246, 264 (D. Conn. 1997)).
84 78 F. Supp. 2d 524.85 Id. at 529.
86 United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004); United
States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998).
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because criminals can disguise files, investigators have probable
cause to view every file and should not be forced to employ
restrictive search methods. 89 Supporting the stance against search
protocols, the Supreme Court has ruled outside the digital search
context that warrants need not outline the methods investigators
plan to employ in conducting a search:
Often in executing a warrant the police may find it
necessary to interfere with privacy rights not
explicitly considered by the judge who issued the
warrant.... It would extend the Warrant Clause to
the extreme to require that, whenever it is
reasonably likely that Fourth Amendment rights
may be affected in more than one way, the court
must set forth precisely the procedures to be
followed by the executing officers.
90
This reasoning has been applied in the digital search
scenario.91 In fact, DOJ tuidelines expressly direct prosecutors to
oppose restrictions imposed by magistrates that require the
government to specify how it will examine digital media to find
evidence responsive to the warrant. 92 Nevertheless, allowing
agents to search every digital media file creates very real concerns.
Many courts and commentators have reacted to this broad
authorization by claiming that it operates with the plain view
doctrine to transform every digital search into the type of general
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
93
89 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 49, at 48-50; Clancy, supra note 68;
Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1196-97.
90 Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1979) (holding that government
agents need not specify the means by which they would execute installation of a
wiretap authorized by warrant).
91 See, e.g, United States v. Vilar, No. S3 05-CR-621, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26993, at *121-25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (citing Dalia for the proposition that
officers should not be required to specify ahead of time how they planned to
search defendants computers, and stating that "[t]he majority view rejecting a
protocol requirement makes good sense as there is no principle in the law that
requires law enforcement officers to limit their investigative techniques ex ante,
before conducting any kind of search.").
92 DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 80.
93 See Chang, supra note 49, at 43-44; Kerr, supra note 47, at 304-05; Trepel,
supra note 15, at 137-38; Winick, supra note 25, at 107-09.
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B. Problems with the Plain View Doctrine in the Context
of Digital Searches
The plain view doctrine operates as one of several
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 94 Under the plain view
doctrine, investigators may seize incriminating evidence without a
warrant if they encounter the evidence in plain view during lawful
observation of the area.95 Horton v. California96 established three
requirements that investigators must meet before lawfully seizing
evidence in plain view. First, the investigator must have lawful
authority to be in the position from which he had occasion to
observe the evidence. Second, the evidence must be in plain view.
Third, the incriminating character of the evidence must be
"immediately apparent"-the plain view doctrine does not
authorize further investigation to determine the evidentiary value
of the evidence. 97 A number of courts have expanded the plain
view doctrine to encompass "plain touch,"98 "plain smell," 99 and
"plain hearing,"'100 corollaries.
The plain view doctrine applies easily to items that appear
incriminating at first glance, such as drugs or guns, and some
documents such as fake ID's, gambling records, and documents
94 See Investigations and Police Practices, supra note 24, at 44 (" [C]ertain kinds
of searches and seizures are valid as exceptions to the probable cause and
warrant requirements, including investigatory stops, investigatory detentions of
property, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizures of items
in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances, consent
searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border
searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the
special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant
requirements impracticable.").
9' See id. at 74-75.
96 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
97 See id. at 136-37; Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987) (noting that
allowing further investigation beyond a cursory examination would "especially
erode the plurality's warning in Coolidge that the 'plain view' doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges' (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971)).
98 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) ("We think that [the
plain view] doctrine has an obvious application by analogy to cases in which an
officer discovers contraband through the sense of touch during an otherwise
lawful search.").
99 See, e.g., United States v. Staula, 80 F.3d 596, 602 (1st Cir. 1996)
("[O]lfactory evidence furnishes the officer with probable cause to conduct a
search of the confined area.").
100 See United States v. Ceballos, 385 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing a
"'plain hearing' exception to the search warrant requirement"); United States v.
Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 1973) (likening the plain view doctrine to a
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linking co-defendants. 1 1 It is less clear that incriminating evidence
is in "plain view" when discovered as investigators examine
intermingled documents in an attempt to separate responsive from
non-responsive items. Difficult cases are easy to conceive. For
example, imagine investigators have obtained a warrant to search a
suspect's belongings for evidence of bank fraud. The warrant
allows the investigators to scan each letter in a stack of letters to
determine which, if any, contain evidence of bank fraud. An
investigator reads the first paragraph of one letter, but cannot
determine whether the letter is relevant, so he continues reading. In
the middle of the second paragraph, he reads the statement, "I hid
the cocaine in the cookie jar. Just ask Jim for the 'fresh baked
goods' and leave the money with him." Assuming the remainder of
the letter contains nothing relevant to bank fraud, its contents
clearly fall outside the scope of the investigators' warrant. The
investigators would like to use the evidence against the suspect in a
subsequent drug trial. Given that the investigator had to read the
first two paragraphs of the letter before discovering any evidence
of drug trafficking, was the evidence really "immediately
apparent" as required by the plain view doctrine?
Courts answer this question with respect to physical
evidence by allowing a "brief perusal of documents in plain view
in order to determine whether probable cause exists for their
seizure under the warrant. If in the course of that perusal, their
otherwise incriminating character becomes obvious, they may be
seized."'10 2 Courts have generally permitted investigators to seize
documents discovered in "plain view," accepting without much
discussion that the investigators must conduct some degree of
perusal to ascertain the relevance of the documents. 1
03
Investigators need not be "absolutely certain" that documents or
other items discovered in plain view constitute evidence of the
crime at hand, 10 4 and may "test their belief by proceeding with a
limited inspection of the 'incriminating object."' However,
"perusal must cease at the point at which the warrant's
inapplicability to each document is clear."' 10 5
101 See Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1197.
102 United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
103 See United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1258 n.8 (2d Cir. 1979).
104 See, e.g., id. at 1258; United States v. Duckett, 583 F.2d 1309, 1314 (5th Cir.
1978) ("There is no rule of law which requires an officer to know with absolute
certainty that all elements of a putative crime have been completed when he
seizes an article which reasonably appears to be incriminating evidence.");
United States v. Pugh, 566 F.2d 626, 627 (8th Cir. 1977); Mapp v. Warden, 531
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Smollar, 357 F. Supp. 628, 632
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("The plain view exception would be worthless if officers had
to be 'absolutely certain' that what they saw was seizable").
105 Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1267.
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Courts have begun to apply this reasoning to digital data.
Most cases involve application of the plain view doctrine to digital
evidence that is incriminating on its face. The visual nature of child
pornography makes it the most common type of evidence seized
under the plain view doctrine during searches of digital property. 1
06
However, courts have suggested the plain view doctrine would
apply to admit evidence that is not graphic in nature if found after
a brief scan of data on a computer screen.
107
This practice arguably transforms all digital search
warrants into general warrants and raises the question: what if
investigators are always in a position from which they can view
everything on the computer screen? If courts authorize
investigators to scan every piece of data on a hard drive to
determine its relevancy, then investigators will always be in a
lawful position from which to view evidence of unrelated crimes.
The warrant's scope would lose all relevance because any evidence
not covered by the warrant could be seized under the plain view
doctrine. Digital searches would become fishing expeditions.
10 8
The majority joining Chief Judge Kozinski's ruling in CDT must
have recognized this danger. The majority took the drastic view
that to "avoid this illogical result, the government should, in future
warrant applications, forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine
or any similar doctrine that would allow it to retain data to which it
has gained access only because it was required to segregate
seizable from non-seizable data."'
10 9
The plain view doctrine, however, serves an important
function in both physical and digital contexts. If police come upon
out-of-scope evidence during the course of an otherwise lawful
search it could be "dangerous-to the evidence or to the police
106 See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003); Frasier v.
State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 465-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the plain view
doctrine when police searching a suspect's computer for evidence of marijuana
happened upon child pornography).
107 See, e.g, United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 531 n.11 (E.D. Va.
1999) ("Agent Ehuan could have continued his systematic search of defendant's
computer files pursuant to the first search warrant, and, as long as he was
searching for the items listed in the warrant, any child pornography discovered
in the course of that search could have been seized under the 'plain view'
doctrine."); State v. Mays, 829 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that an officer's observation of the words "he will die today" on defendant's
computer screen while lawfully present in defendant's home fell within the
ambit of the plain view doctrine); Commonwealth v. Hinds, 768 N.E.2d 1067
(Mass. 2002) (holding that the officer "was not obligated to disregard files listed
in plain view on the 'Chuck' directory whose titles suggested contents that were
contraband").
108 See Chang, supra note 49 (arguing for the abolition of the plain view doctrine
in order to prevent general searches of digital property).
109 CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009).
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themselves-to require them to ignore it."' 110 A search for evidence
of tax evasion might yield evidence that the suspects plans to kill
his wife for insurance money. Police may need to seize out-of-
scope evidence to prevent a heinous crime.
Requiring investigators to forswear reliance on the plain
view doctrine in the Ninth Circuit has already had deleterious
effects on law enforcement efforts to uphold the law and protect
vulnerable individuals. In the Western District of Washington,
federal agents received information from their
counterparts in San Diego that two individuals had
filmed themselves raping a four-year-old girl and
traded the images via the internet. The agents did
not obtain a warrant to search the suspects'
computers, however, because of concerns that any
evidence discovered about other potential victims
could not be disclosed by the filter team.
I II
Fortunately, federal agents could refer the case to state authorities,
who are not bound by the restrictions outlined in CDT. This
example stresses that a blanket elimination of the plain view
doctrine could create more threats to society than it prevents.
Eliminating the plain view doctrine may have less
dramatic, but equally serious effects. If investigators could not
seize out-of-scope evidence in plain view, investigators might
"result in the loss of highly probative evidence about the very
crime under investigation." 112 This could occur, for example,
"when a warrant contains a date restriction but the resulting search
turns up evidence that the crime began or continued after officers
previously had reason to believe." 113 Investigators have a
legitimate interest in pursuing out-of-scope evidence to uphold
society's laws and thwart criminal activity, when possible.
C. Plain View Problems for Privileged Data and Third
Parties
The view-all-use-all practices that result from the direct
application of traditional rules to digital searches also raise hackles
where privileged documents and third parties are concerned."
4
110 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
ill Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court, supra note 1, at 6-7.112 Id. at 14.
113 Id.
114 See United States v. Abbell, 963 F. Supp. 1178, 1198-99 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(allowing perusal of all files, and approving of the government's use of a taint
team to protect privileged materials); State v. Viatical Servs., Inc., 741 So. 2d
2009-2010
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Investigators may peruse all intermingled data to ascertain its
relevancy, and in doing so may examine privileged documents or
third party information regardless of whether it falls within the
scope of the warrant. Incriminating information in "plain view"
may be seized and used to charge third parties previously
considered innocent. 115
In order to protect third party privacy, the Attorney General
has issued rules requiring federal officers to pursue relevant
evidence in the hands of disinterested third parties by issuing
subpoenas rather than warrants. 1 16 Pursuant to these rules, federal
officers may only seek a warrant to obtain materials from a
disinterested third party when it appears that "the use of a
subpoena, summons, request, or other less intrusive alternative
means of obtaining the materials would substantially jeopardize the
availability or usefulness of the materials sought." 7 This policy
sounds promising, but third parties receive little protection once
the government decides to pursue evidence with a warrant because
"failure to comply with this policy 'may not be litigated, and a
court may not entertain such an issue as the basis for the
suppression or exclusion of evidence.'
118
560, 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) ("[T]he court must fashion a remedy to
protect the privacy rights of innocent third parties while still allowing the state
to proceed with its criminal investigation."); Chang, supra note 49, at 58
(discussing privilege as a possible limitation on the plain view doctrine);
Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1153, 1170-72 (expressing concern that a third
party will get "caught up in the government's dragnet," and analyzing the use of
taint teams to prevent prosecutors from accessing privileged data).
115 See, e.g., CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (The directory searched
by the government "contained a huge number of drug testing records, not only
of the ten players for whom the government had probable cause but hundreds of
other professional baseball players, thirteen other sports organizations, three
unrelated sporting competitions, and a non-sports business entity-thousands of
files in all, reflecting the test results of an unknown number of people, most
having no relationship to professional baseball except that they had the bad luck
of having their test results stored on the same computer as the baseball
players.").
116 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 111 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(a)(1)
(2009)).
117 28 C.F.R. § 59.4(a)(1).
118 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 111 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 59.5(b)).
Congress has enacted statutory schemes to offer a higher degree of protection to
third party internet service providers, and third party publishers, journalists,
authors, or other individuals where a search of his or her possessions may
implicate First Amendment concerns. See id. at 101-09, 112-33. The Stored
Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006), regulates
government access to electronic records stored by third-party service providers.
See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 112. The Privacy Protection Act (PPA),
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, governs federal computer searches when agents have
reason to believe they will encounter materials relating to freedom of
expression. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 101. However, both acts
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Where the government has obtained a warrant to search
digital media containing privileged information, the DOJ
Guidelines offer strategies for reviewing privileged computer files:
First, the court itself may review the files in
camera. Second, the presiding judge may appoint a
neutral third party known as a "special master" to
the task of reviewing the files. Third, a team of
prosecutors or agents who are not working on the
case may form a "filter team" or "taint team" to
help execute the search and review the files
afterwards. The filter team sets up a so-called
"ethical wall" between the evidence and the
prosecution team, permitting only unprivileged files
to pass over the wall." 19
To protect privileged information, the Department of Justice
prefers to segregate data using taint teams composed of attorneys
or agents who are not members of the prosecution team. However,
the use of taint teams is not mandatory, nor do all jurisdictions
condone the use of taint teams.120 Computers belonging to medical
and legal professionals often contain a spectrum of confidential or
privileged material such as client or patient communications,
medical records, or attorney work product. 12 1 "[T]he use of
computerized equipment for the storage and exchange of sensitive
confidential information has become commonplace."' 122 If a
comprehensive search requires investigators to review every file, it
seems that privileged documents must suffer some type of scrutiny.
The fact that the scrutinizing eyes do not belong directly to the
harbor loopholes with respect to warrants. If the government obtains a warrant
to search data held by an internet service provider, the SCA allows investigating
agents to obtain everything associated with an account, and does not require
agents to notify customers or subscribers that the agents have obtained
information from the provider. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703. The PPA purports to
require the use of a subpoena to obtain materials relating to freedom of
expression, but "[t]he PPA does not apply in a search for or seizure of
'documentary materials' as defined by § 2000aa-7(a), if a subpoena has proven
inadequate or there is reason to believe that a subpoena would not result in the
production of the materials." DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 104; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000aa(b)(3)-(4).
119 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 110. The "ethical wall" is also
referred to as a "Chinese wall." See In re Search Warrant for Law Offices, 153
F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).120 See Chang, supra note 49, at 58.
121 See id.; United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1037
(D. Nev. 2006).122 Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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prosecution team may offer little comfort. 123 Courts have vacillated
on whether in camera review, review by special master, or review
by a taint team most effectively protects privileged digital
materials without unduly hampering the government's
investigation.
The court in United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.
124
noted, "[f]ederal courts have taken a skeptical view of the
Government's use of 'taint teams' as an appropriate method for
determining whether seized or subpoenaed records are protected by
the attorney-client privilege."' 125 The court in In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas126 cautioned that taint teams might leak confidential
information. The government has an interest in uncovering every
scrap of evidence to further the investigation, and while some leaks
occur through human error, human nature may lead taint-team
attorneys to violate their ethical obligations. 127  "[T]he
government's fox is left in charge of the appellants' henhouse, and
may err by neglect or malice, as well as by honest differences of
opinion.
128
Courts have also noted the drawbacks to using a special
master or neutral magistrate to separate privileged materials. In
Black v. United States129 the court pointed out that using special
masters can incur high costs and fees, and they may take a
prohibitive amount of time to review the contested materials. In
one instance, appointment of a special master delayed a criminal
trial for two and a half years.' 30 Such a delay could "effectively
deprive the Government of any access to any of the seized
information."' 131 A magistrate or special master might have many
duties that conflict with the task of reviewing millions of computer
123 See id. at 516 ("The Plaintiffs have a serious concern that disclosure to taint
team prosecutors would not protect the confidentiality and privacy rights they
here assert.").
124SDIFuture Health, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1027.125 Id. at 1037.
126In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2006).
127 Id. at 523.
128 Id.; see also United States v. Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(deciding that privileged materials should be reviewed by a special master
despite the government's appointment of a taint team); In re Search Warrant for
Law Offices, 153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]his Court notes that
reliance on the implementation of a Chinese Wall, especially in the context of a
criminal prosecution, is highly questionable, and should be discouraged."); cf
United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 841 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997) (criticizing the
use of taint teams, but noting that "[h]owever unwise this policy decision may
be, absent a showing of harm, it does not offend the Constitution").129 Black v. United States, 172 F.R.D. 511, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
130 Id. at 514 n.4, 516 (citing Abbell, 914 F. Supp. 519).
131 Id. at 516.
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files, whereas a taint team specifically designated to segregate
privileged materials could do so in a timely manner.1
32
The court in the case of In re 5444 Westheimer Rd. Suite
1570133 determined that the lengthy amount of time a special
master or magistrate judge would require to review privileged
materials outweighed the protection this method might afford.
Instead, the court allowed the government to proceed with taint
team review.134 The court noted that the government's taint team
procedure did not prejudice defendants because the use of a taint
team gave defendants the opportunity to challenge the taint team's
privilege determinations in front of the court. The court would then
resolve any privilege disputes before the taint team could disclose
materials classified as unprivileged to the prosecution team. 135 In
contrast, a neutral magistrate or special master may not offer the
defendants the same opportunity to challenge privilege
determinations.
136
The controversy incited by the government's seizure of
third party drug records in CDT demonstrates how computers'
massive storage capacities have magnified the problem. The fact
that the targeted computers contained vast quantities of third party
data allowed the government to seize "thousands of medical
records and test results involving every single Major League
Baseball player," and "thousands of other medical records for
individuals in thirteen other major sports organizations, three
unaffiliated business entities, and three sports competitions,"
despite the fact that the government only had a search warrant for a
small handful of MLB players, and none of the other individuals
were the subject of any criminal inquiry.13 7 This result highlights
the distinction between physical and digital searches: "people now
have personal data that are stored with that of innumerable
strangers. Seizure of, for example, Google's email servers to look
132 See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 110; Black, 172 F.R.D. at 516 n.8.
133 No. H-06-238, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48850 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2006).134 Id. at *9.135 Id. at *9, *11 n.5.
136 See United States v. Grant, which approved the use of a taint team. No. 04
CR 207, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004). The court
noted that "after the initial privilege determination is made by the special master
or judicial officer, the Government would not have the opportunity to brief or
argue the ruling aided by the contents of the documents. Without the benefit of
such a review, the privilege team would likely be unable to argue, for example,
that no attorney-client privilege attached to the communication because of the
crime-fraud exception, or that a document should be available for use at trial,
regardless of work-product contents, because of necessity and unavailability by
other means." Id. at *4-5.
137 CDTI, 513 F.3d 1085, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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for a few incriminating messages could jeopardize the privacy of
millions.'
138
Investigators searching a suspect's home or office could
rarely net such an abundance of evidence. The court in Black v.
United States might have been speaking to privileged documents
when it called for "a re-thinking of some of the traditional
approaches Courts have made in years gone by,"'139 but it was not
alone in seeking a new approach to regulating search and seizure
of digital media.
D. The Carey-Winick "Special Approach" to Digital
Searches
Both scholars and courts have referenced the enormous
storage capabilities of digital media to justify the viewpoint that
digital searches cannot and should not be compared to physical-
world searches. 140 In his influential article, Ralph Winick
emphasized that the "very quantity and variety of information" on
a computer "increases the likelihood that highly personal
information, irrelevant to the subject of the lawful investigation,
will also be searched or seized.",141 Winick recognized the threat
created by allowing investigators to examine intermingled
documents, and argued that application of traditional rules to
searches of digital media "allows officers to gain a window into all
aspects of a suspect's life.' 42 Instead, Winick advocated for
applying the "intermingled-document" approach outlined in United
States v. Tamura14 3 to digital media searches. In his proposal for a
new approach, Winick discredited the theory that comprehensive
computer searches require investigators to peruse every file on the
hard drive. Instead of conducting a full review of digital files, he
proposed investigators limit their search of the data by file type, or
use key word searches to locate relevant files. He opined that
government agents should seal any intermingled files, and submit
specific search protocol to a neutral magistrate for approval before
proceeding with review of those files.
144
131 CDTII, 579 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009).
139 172 F.R.D. 511, 514 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
140 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999);
Chang, supra note 49, at 35-36; Kerr, supra note 47, at 301-03.
141 Winick, supra note 25, at 105.
142 Id. at 111.
143 694 F.2d 591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982) ("In the comparatively rare instances
where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted on site,
we suggest that the Government and law enforcement officials generally can
avoid violating fourth amendment rights by sealing and holding the documents
pending approval by a magistrate of a further search ...
144 Winick, supra note 25, at 107-09.
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The Tenth Circuit has been the strongest proponent of
using a "special approach" for digital media searches. 145 The court
in United States v. Carey 146 became the first to adopt Winick's
"special approach" explicitly. 147 Carey expanded upon Winick's
"special approach" by suggesting that investigators should obtain a
second warrant before seizing out-of-scope evidence discovered in
plain view. 148
While some have approved of the "Carey-Winick"
approach, 149 others have been quick to point out its flaws. Courts
rejecting the approach have continued to allow investigators to
peruse all intermingled documents because requiring search
methods would be too restrictive. 15 Scholars also questioned the
wisdom of limiting the extent to which investigators could open
and view files, citing the argument that criminals may disguise
evidence in ways investigators may not be able to predict.'
5
'
145 Regensburger, supra note 3, at 1157.
146 United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
147 See id. at 1275-76; Trepel, supra note 15, at 130.
141 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271, 1276. DOJ guidelines note that when agents
discover evidence in plain view that is not identified by the warrant, it would be
a "safe practice" to obtain a second warrant. However, this practice is not
mandatory. See DOJ GUIDELINES, supra note 67, at 90.
149 The term "Carey-Winick" was coined by David Ziff in a 2005 piece
criticizing the approach's limitations. See David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth
Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer Searches Conducted
Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 841, 842 & n.4 (2005). For
examples of courts approving of the Carey-Winick limitations, see United States
v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 862 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. Walser, 275
F.3d 981, 986-87 (10th Cir. 2001); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 411 n.2 (4th
Cir. 2001); and People v. Carratu, 755 N.Y.S.2d 800 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
150 See United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090-91 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("Forcing police
to limit their searches to files that the suspect has labeled in a particular way
would be much like saying police may not seize a plastic bag containing a
powdery white substance if it is labeled 'flour' or 'talcum powder.' There is no
way to know what is in a file without examining its contents, just as there is no
sure way of separating talcum from cocaine except by testing it."); United States
v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999); Commonwealth v.
McDermott, 864 N.E.2d 471, 488-89 (Mass. 2007) (specifically declining to
adopt the special approach outlined in Carey).
151 See Clancy, supra note 68, at 207-08 ("[T]here are significant reasons to
reject [Carey's] position that a search be restricted by file names or file types.
Professional investigators recognize that computer users attempt to conceal
criminal evidence by storing it 'in random order with deceptive file names,' thus
requiring a search of all the stored data to determine whether it is included in the
warrant." (citation omitted)); Trepel, supra note 15, at 134 ("According to Kerr,
the process required by the Carey-Tamura approach is flawed for the very
practical reason that 'computer forensics is contingent, fact-bound, and quite
unpredictable.' An investigator will not know beforehand which operating
system is on the device to be searched, which software is on it, or whether the
suspect attempted to hide or disguise any incriminating files." (footnote
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Others have criticized the suggestion that a neutral
magistrate should determine which files the government should
access. When Winick first outlined his proposal, the idea of
magistrate oversight was plausible: computers at that time only
held 100 megabytes of data, the equivalent of 100,000 typed pages.
Investigators could reasonably print the file directory for
magistrate review. Modern computers, however, store considerably
more information, and it would be prohibitively time consuming
for lawyers to quibble in front of a magistrate over the contents of
a huge volume of files.
152
Finally, some have found fault with the use of a second
warrant to pursue evidence discovered outside the scope of the
original warrant. A second warrant may fail to protect privacy
concerns implicated by the plain view doctrine because
investigators will have already discovered the out-of-scope
evidence without previous probable cause. Assume for the sake of
argument that investigators should forswear reliance on the plain
view doctrine when conducting digital searches. Under this rule, if
investigators searching for evidence of bank fraud come across
child pornography, they cannot seize it as evidence "in plain
view," but they can apply for a second warrant to expand their
search based on the image they have just discovered. The
application will likely be granted since investigators now have
concrete evidence of a possible second crime. For the purposes of
the second warrant, it matters not whether the evidence fell within
the scope of the first. Therefore, the second warrant procedure
creates a loophole to the ban on seizing evidence in plain view by
authorizing investigators to seize the same out-of-scope evidence
without relying on the plain view doctrine. 153 According to critics,
this "easy-to-meet" procedure is "functionally equivalent to the
plain view doctrine."'
154
There has been no consensus amongst different factions as
to how investigators should execute search warrants for digital
media without violating the Fourth Amendment. This dissonance
has led to conflicting rules and results, highlighting the dire need
for lawmakers to issue guidance or regulation in this area.
IV. A STATUTORY SOLUTION
To effect a solution, federal and state legislatures should
adopt a set of rules that augment the Fourth Amendment with
omitted)); supra Parts ILA, III.A (discussing the argument that investigators
must peruse all files to circumvent attempts to conceal evidence).152 See Ziff, supra note 149, at 860-61.
153 See Chang, supra note 49, at 48, 50.
154 Id. at 50.
31
Robinton: COURTING CHAOS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 311 (2010)
respect to search and seizure of digital media. For example, Rule
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently governs
search and seizure pursuant to a warrant for federal
investigations. 155 This rule and corresponding state rules could be
amended to incorporate specific sections pertaining to warrants for
search and seizure of digital property. Legislative action offers
several advantages over the solutions implemented by courts.
Legislatures are not limited by stare decisis, and thus have more
flexibility to design new rules. 156 While courts may stray from
precedent when changed conditions and increased knowledge
render existing rules unworkable, 157 a court's influence may extend
only as far as its jurisdiction. Legislatures can promulgate rules
that span jurisdictions, thus facilitating consistent practices.
An opinion issued by the Supreme Court could settle
controversy across jurisdictions, but the Supreme Court may only
address issues presented in the case before it. The Supreme Court
will never hear a case presenting every nuanced issue raised by a
digital media search. Legislatures, on the other hand, do not need
to wait until a problem presents itself. Legislatures can also effect
changes much more quickly than many courts across many
jurisdictions.158
Additionally, legislatures may be more competent than
courts to address the problem of digital media searches, because "it
is difficult for judges to fashion lasting guidance when
technologies are new and rapidly changing."' 159 While legislatures
receive information from a wide range of sources, including
legislative hearings, advocacy groups, constituent and public input,
national media, and special caucuses, judges receive information
funneled through the briefs and oral arguments of two parties.
160
Legislative branches are better situated to gather information about
the developing technologies that both complicate and facilitate
digital searches.
A. With Privacy and Justice for All
To walk the line between privacy and justice, legislatures
need to adopt rules for digital property searches that offer more
protection than the traditional approach to search and seizure, but
fewer restrictions than the "special approach" described by the
155 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
156 See Kerr, supra note 47, at 308.
157 See Trepel, supra note 15, at 142.158 Id.; Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 868-70
(2004).
159 Kerr, supra note 158, at 858.
160 Id. at 875-76.
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Carey-Winick doctrine. The following three subsections each
describes a rule that legislatures should adopt to strike this balance.
Legislatures should: 1) require narrow search protocols, but allow
file-by-file searches where necessary; 2) require a second warrant
for the seizure of ambiguous out-of-scope evidence, but allow
investigators to seize contraband under the plain view doctrine;
and 3) require a taint team to review privileged or third party files.
The taint team should afford the defense the opportunity to
challenge privileged determinations. The third subsection also
recommends a procedure for the taint team to follow if it
encounters evidence that incriminates a third party.
1. The Narrow Search Protocol Requirement
As explained in Section IV.A, the traditional approach to
search and seizure in theory allows investigators to scan every file
in search of evidence. Investigators need not follow a pre-specified
protocol to examine digital records. In reality, however,
investigators have neither the time nor the resources to scan every
piece of data on a hard drive. Forensic investigators will use
whatever methods they can to narrow the subset of data they must
search in order to discover evidence that responds to the
warrant. 161 Creating a rule that requires investigators to use
reasonable methods to narrow their searches would serve the
interests of both the Fourth Amendment and government
investigators. Where less intrusive, more effective search methods
exist, it would be unreasonable not to require investigators to
employ those methods.
162
Legislatures should therefore require forensic investigators
to begin searching digital media with available forensic tools such
as hashing programs, EnCase, FTK, or other tools on the market.
Due to the rapid pace of technological development, it would not
be wise for legislatures to require the use of specific tools. Such a
rule would tie investigators to outdated programs upon the
invention of new search technology.
A new rule requiring the use of these programs will assuage
fears that investigators will examine every piece of data, because
investigators will always conduct hashes and key word searches as
an initial step. If these steps returned the sought-after evidence, the
search should cease. This rule would not hinder searches because
most investigators already use these programs to narrow the set of
data to be searched.
If the warrant authorizes investigators to search for images,
and hashes or key word searches cannot locate the images sought,
161 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66.
162 See McLain, supra note 65, at 1097-98.
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investigators may scan all digital images, but should not extend
this file-by-file search to word documents or other file types.
However, the rule should recognize that criminals might disguise
evidence. If an investigator discovers a file with an altered
extension, the investigator would have reason to believe the
suspect attempted to conceal evidence. In this case, the investigator
may open the altered file even if that file type would not normally
contain evidence associated with the alleged crime.
Forensic tools will not flag misnamed files in all cases,
therefore, legislatures should allow investigators to begin opening
and scanning all files if, and only if, narrow search methods fail to
produce results. Investigators should not be required to obtain
permission from the court before expanding their search. Some
might argue that such a permissive rule would encourage
unscrupulous investigators to ignore the narrow search
requirement. However, codification of the narrow search
requirement will keep law enforcement in check; if a defendant
challenges the legality of the search, the law should place the
burden on investigators to prove to the court that they conducted a
narrow search before proceeding with a more intrusive one. The
above-described rules align with many restrictions described by the
Carey-Winick doctrine, but also square with traditional doctrine by
authorizing investigators to conduct a more comprehensive search
where required.
2. The Plain View Doctrine and the Second Warrant
Requirement
Requiring investigators to waive the plain view doctrine, as
described in CDT, is a drastic and dangerous step. "A search of a
computer for evidence of fraud, for example, could reveal evidence
of a planned terrorist attack or a search aimed at drug trafficking
could reveal evidence of an ongoing violent crime or sexual
abuse."' 163 Abolishing the plain view doctrine with respect to
digital searches may create risks to society that outweigh those
created by governmental intrusion into individual privacy. 64
Furthermore, if legislatures pass laws that limit digital
searches as described above in Subsection V.A.1, the plain view
doctrine becomes less problematic. Investigators will no longer
have the authority to search every file in all cases, which diffuses
the threat of the general search. If investigators discover out-of-
scope evidence during the course of their search under the new
rule, investigators may pursue evidence under the plain view
163 See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full
Court, supra note 1, at 14.
164 See supra Part III.B.
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doctrine if that evidence clearly demonstrates criminal behavior.
For example, a person cannot legally possess child pornography.
Thus, if child pornography exists on a person's hard drive, a crime
has occurred and investigators may seize this contraband under the
plain view doctrine.
However, investigators should obtain a second warrant
before seizing out-of-scope evidence if questions arise as to
whether the evidence meets the "immediately incriminating"
requirement of the plain view doctrine. In this scenario, the second
warrant requirement will ensure that investigators indeed have
probable cause to seize the potentially incriminating evidence. For
example, suppose investigators searching for images for child
pornography stumble upon an image of a letter that reads, "How
much would it cost to hire a hit man to kill Joe and his family on
Thursday night?" Either this statement could be evidence of
murder for hire, or it could simply be exaggerated venting, or the
exercise of a person's right to free speech under the First
Amendment. 165 Requiring investigators to submit a second warrant
application to a neutral magistrate will ensure that the government
can legally admit this evidence at trial, and shields government
agents from claims of misconduct.
In addition, a second warrant may authorize investigators to
continue searching for evidence related to the second crime.
Investigators could gather the evidence needed to bring charges
quickly, which could prevent a dangerous person from committing
an act of violence.
3. Protecting Third Parties and Privileged Documents
Searches of digital media containing privileged data, or
data pertaining to third parties require special considerations.
166
Where investigators must issue a warrant to search computers
containing either type of data, the case agents and forensic
investigators should first narrow the set of data to be searched by
using forensic tools and other reasonable limitations. If the in-
scope evidence exists amongst privileged data or data pertaining to
third parties, the most practical and protective measure would be to
allow a taint team to review those materials. The taint team should
be composed of disinterested forensic investigators, agents, and
165 Interview with Chris Beeson, supra note 66 (explaining an example of out-
of-scope evidence that does not necessarily point to illegal activity, and
emphasizing THAT this evidence must be treated with "kid gloves," unlike
evidence of child pornography, which is illegal in-and-of itself to possess).
166 See supra Part III.C (discussing the threats posed by the plain view doctrine
to third parties and privileged documents, and different methods courts endorse
to mitigate these threats).
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attorneys who would review privileged and third party materials to
cull non-responsive items.
For cases involving privileged documents, the government
should provide the defense with the opportunity to review any data
categorized as unprivileged, and allow the defense to challenge
that categorization in front of the court. In re 5444 Westheimer Rd.
Suite 1570167 approved of this procedure and noted that it did not
prejudice the defendant because privilege disputes would be
resolved by the court before the taint team could disclose materials
to the prosecution team.168 A neutral magistrate or special master
would not offer the government the same opportunity to challenge
privilege determinations. Additionally, use of a special master or
neutral magistrate would strain government and judicial resources
and slow the investigation, as described in Section IV.C.
Where an investigation involves examination of digital
media containing the data of unrelated third parties, members of
the prosecution team should not view the intermingled data. A
disinterested individual or taint team should segregate the data and
provide the prosecution team with information pertaining to the
suspect. If the taint team discovers evidence that incriminates a
third party, the taint team may disclose that information to the
prosecution team if doing so will prevent harm to another person
or entity. The taint team should consult a disinterested attorney to
determine whether the team has an ethical obligation to disclose
the evidence to prevent harm. It should be noted that the taint team
would not be authorized to scan every privileged or third party file.
Unless the narrower search failed, the taint team would be required
to conduct a narrow search using forensic tools as described in
Subsection IV.A. 1. Additionally, if the taint team refers a piece of
evidence that incriminates an unrelated third party to the
prosecution team, the prosecution team must obtain a second
warrant before pursing that evidence. The second warrant
requirement would be waived if the evidence is contraband or
clearly demonstrates that a crime has occurred. These safeguards
deter unscrupulous conduct, and ensure that the prosecution team
will not conduct an exploratory search of third party data in an
effort to discover evidence with which to charge new crimes.
CONCLUSION
Digital media has become an integral part of the lives of
many Americans, and advancements in technology will continue to
blur the line between physical and digital worlds. As we import,
167 In re 5444 Westheimer Rd. Suite 1570, No. H-06-238, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48850 (S.D. Tex. July 6, 2006).168 Id. at *9, *11 n.5.
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upload, or download more of our personal lives onto digital media,
privacy stakes rise. Without clarity from legislatures, courts will
continue to grapple over the application of the Fourth Amendment
to digital media searches. Courts applying traditional Fourth
Amendment principles risk eroding the relevancy of search
warrants by allowing every warrant authorize an exploratory
search. Courts crafting new guidelines risk tying the hands of
investigators and hopelessly frustrating the legitimate purposes of
law enforcement. In order to formulate sound rules for governing
the search and seizure of digital property, legislatures must strike a
balance between these competing factions. To strike this balance,
legislatures should:
1) Require narrow search protocols, but allow file-
by-file searches where necessary;
2) Require a second warrant for the seizure of out-
of-scope evidence that does not immediately
demonstrate that a crime has occurred. Investigators
may seize contraband without a second warrant
under the plain view doctrine; and
3) Require a taint team to review privileged or third
party files. The taint team should afford the defense
the opportunity to challenged privileged
determinations. If the taint team encounters
evidence incriminating a third party it should
consult a disinterested attorney to determine
whether the team should disclose the evidence.
Legislatures adopting this approach will provide courts with the
clarity needed to enforce privacy protections while preserving the
legitimate goals of law enforcement.
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